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Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative on China’s
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) using a dataset of all host countries for the period of
2010–2015. The employed econometric technique combines a difference-in-differences estimator
with matching techniques. The results show that China’s OFDI in OBOR countries is about 40%
higher than in non-OBOR countries. After the initiative, the OFDI from China increases by 46.2%
in OBOR countries. However, after controlling for the heterogeneity across OBOR and non-OBOR
countries using the matching approach, the significance of the increasing effect caused by the
OBOR initiative disappears. We also find the OBOR initiative diminishes the resource-seeking
motivation and improves the market-seeking motivation of China’s OFDI. Our results cast doubts
on the infrastructure-led and institution-based strategy of the OBOR initiative, but support the
boosting effect of the OBOR initiative on institutional cooperation and cultural convergence.
Thus, the OBOR initiative is a sustainable continuation and development of the long tradition of
economic, institutional, and cultural convergence with the OBOR countries, rather than a temporary
policy shock.
Keywords: One Belt One Road (OBOR); outward foreign direct investment (OFDI); cultural distance;
institutional distance; treatment effect models
1. Introduction
The One Belt One Road (OBOR) policy involves two factors: ‘One Belt’ denotes the Silk Road
Economic Belt and ‘One Road’ denotes the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The OBOR aims to
promote China’s integration into a more open global economy. The One Belt (OB) initiative includes
countries in Central Asia, West Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (green areas in Figure A1 in
Appendix A), which was unveiled by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan on 7 September 2013.
Less than a month later, President Xi Jinping announced the One Road (OR) initiative in Indonesia
on 3 October 2013, which includes countries throughout the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and the
South Pacific to Europe and East Africa (dark green areas in Figure A1 in Appendix A). Since its
inception in late 2013, the OBOR initiative has become a Chinese national strategy to integrate China’s
economy with those of countries and regions in Asia, Europe, and Africa [1], and sustained its economic
growth by developing closer cooperation with these partners [2]. As a means of enhancing China’s
global influence, a range of new government policies following the OBOR initiative have been strongly
supporting China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI).
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China’s government has encouraged Chinese enterprises to search abroad and participate in
cross-border investment (‘Going Out Strategy’), which has been an important aspect of the agenda since
the beginning of the new millennium [3,4]. The OBOR initiative is thought to be an upgrade policy
with the aim to connect China more closely to Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Africa,
and East-Central Europe. The OBOR countries include more than 65 economies that account for over
4 billion people in terms of population. The economic aggregate of the OBOR countries is about
$21 trillion, nearly 65% land-based global production values and 30% maritime-based values [5].
By creating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund (SRF), the New
Development Bank (NDB), amongst other government-led programs, China has made a convincing
commitment to the OBOR initiative for a more open world economy, which aims to become an
important and maybe a central part of the globalization in the new era. Since the OBOR initiative
mostly covers low-income economies with 64% of the world population but only 30% of the world gross
domestic product (GDP), this vast underdeveloped region has the potential to become a new growth
engine of the global economy and create new markets for China’s exports and OFDI [2]. In 2010,
China’s outward and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) were only $68.8 and $114.7 billion,
respectively. However, the OFDI from China almost tripled to $183.1 billion over the period of
2010–2016, while inward FDI only increased by about 15% to $133.7 billion (Figure 1) [6], indicating
that China has transformed from a global manufacturer to a global investor with a substantial increase
of the OFDI [1]. Nowadays, China has become the second largest source and recipient of OFDI,
following the U.S. Consequently, the question arises as to whether or how China’s OBOR initiative
might have influenced its OFDI, especially in the OBOR countries, which is the main focus of this paper.
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reform [7]. Thus, the international community still hesitates to regard the so-called “China model” as
a replacement of the American-led international economic architecture [2].
China has achieved impressive economic growth since the 1970s by attracting enormous FDI from
developed economies. However, as China’s economy has been the new normal with moderate growth
since 2012, the sustainability of the China model as a global manufacturer is facing unprecedented
challenges. Here, our main argument is that China’s OBOR initiative, as a new regional cooperation
model used to accelerate China’s transformation from an FDI receiver to an FDI provider for the
next stage of sustainable development, is an important strategy to sustain its economic growth by
continuing its long tradition of economic, institutional, and cultural convergence with the OBOR
countries. Whether or how the OBOR initiative can stimulate and guide the motivation of Chinese
foreign investment and promote the OFDI from China in the OBOR countries was studied.
Despite being an important and intriguing matter to policymakers, industry experts,
and academics, existing literature on this topic is surprisingly limited. Previous studies are focused on
China’s FDI flows to the developed or emerging economies, such as Africa and Poland [8,9]. However,
these studies are not concerned with the systematic effect of the OBOR initiative on China’s OFDI,
and only a few papers discuss the OBOR initiative. Liu et al. [3] identified the main determinants
of China’s OFDI in the OBOR countries, such as infrastructure facilities, market potential, exchange
rate levels, and openness of host countries. However, the dataset used in that study includes only
93 countries and regions (49 OBOR and 44 non-OBOR countries). The comparatively small sample
size and ambiguous categorization cannot fully consider the difference between the OBOR (more than
65 countries) and non-OBOR countries (more than 140 countries), preventing accurate analysis
of the difference between the continental One Belt (OB) and maritime One Road (OR) countries.
For example, in the work by Liu et al. [3], Hong Kong SAR, Algeria, Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland,
Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and the United Kingdom belong to the OBOR
country group. However, these countries or regions are generally regarded as non-OBOR countries
by the authoritative OBOR dataset hosted by Social Science Academic Press (China) and reports,
such as the report by Du and Zhang [1]. Thus, we followed the country categorization provided by
Du and Zhang [1] rather than Liu et al. [2] (Table A1 and Figure A1 in Appendix A).
In a study by Du and Zhang [1], the effect of the OBOR initiative on China’s OFDI is analyzed by
applying the difference-in-differences (DID) technique to firm-level data. They concluded that China’s
OFDI favors Russia, Central and West Asia, and Western Europe, and increases more significantly in
the continental OB countries than in the maritime OR countries. However, the OBOR and non-OBOR
countries are not two randomly selected groups, and therefore, estimation results from a simple DID
are biased by the selection problem in acquisition literature. Better control on the heterogeneity of the
OB, OR, and non-OBOR countries can improve the validity of these conclusions.
In view of the growing attention focused on China’s OBOR initiative and the debate about
the growing importance of China’s OFDI, several problems still remain and should be further
analyzed before we can have a consensus on this subject. First of all, China’s OFDI used to be
regarded as infrastructure-led investment and was focused on the mining and energy industries
before the OBOR initiative was proposed [10]. As the OBOR initiative is also regarded as
infrastructure-led and resource-seeking, the OBOR countries can receive massive infrastructure
investment from China to improve the availability and quality of their logistics facilities [3]. Hence,
the infrastructure improvement in the OBOR countries can mitigate the disadvantages of infrastructure
distance of the host countries from China and boost resource-seeking FDI inflow from China.
Du and Zhang [1] argued that, in order to increase international competitiveness and meet the needs
of domestic consumption, the objective of China’s OFDI has shifted from seeking production factors to
seeking market power. Thus, the shifting motivation of China’s OFDI from natural resources to the
global market is still a problem, calling for thorough study under the OBOR initiative.
Second, China is regarded as a model of state capitalism [1] and China’s policy and environment
that are based on its political and economic institutions are not completely compatible with
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international standards and customs. However, the stable political situation, liberal policies,
and governance of the host countries can attract more OFDI from China [10,11]. On the other
hand, the degraded institutional environment and weak governance of the host country could
also be considered as an advantage by China’s OFDI [12–14]. Hence, institution-based OFDI
can be encouraged by the institutional distance of host countries from China. Nevertheless,
this institutional distance significantly reduced by high-level policy coordination, international political
cooperation, and government support under the OBOR initiative [3] discourages institution-based
OFDI. As a consequence, in order to provide an understanding of the institutional distance influence
of host countries on China’s OFDI, this paper sheds new light on the institution-based OFDI from
China under the OBOR initiative.
Third, China has a long history of Confucian tradition, which is different from the cultural
backgrounds of most host countries. The cultural distance of host countries is expected to impede FDI
from China [10], but could increase the cultural attraction and encourage FDI. This paper not only
considers the economic and institutional differences between China and the OBOR countries, but also
reveals the mechanism of the cultural tradition of ‘harmony in diversity’ in these OBOR countries to
promote China’s OFDI. Therefore, we endeavored to identify the economic, institutional, and cultural
determinants of China’s OFDI in the OBOR countries.
This paper’s contributions involve three aspects: first, we establish a panel dataset over the
period of 2010–2015, including 216 countries/regions (74 OBOR countries and 142 countries outside
the OBOR), in which we also identified 49 land belt (OB) countries and 25 sea road (OR) countries.
This dataset includes almost all countries and regions around world. For simplicity, we did not
differentiate between countries and regions in this paper. We use country dummies for all relevant
countries and regions in the next sections. To the best of our knowledge, it is the largest sample used
for this subject. Second, we measure the variables of natural resource, market size, infrastructure
facility, institution, and culture of the host countries. The effects of these variables under the OBOR
initiative estimated to investigate the impact of the shifting motivation and infrastructure, institution,
and cultural distance on China’s OFDI. Third, in order to correct the selection biases, we combine
DID estimation with matching techniques to identify the causal impacts of the OBOR initiative on
China’s OFDI. Our basic conclusion is that the OBOR initiative has positively influenced China’s OFDI.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and sets up our hypotheses, Section 3
describes data and variables, Section 4 introduces the empirical methodology, Section 5 presents the
empirical results, and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Resource-Seeking
Dunning [15,16] developed the main theoretical framework for FDI determinants and
identified three advantages of abroad investment—ownership, location, and internalization—and
three motivations of FDI: resource-seeking, market-seeking, and efficiency-seeking [10,12–14,17].
Efficiency-seeking FDI mainly seeks low-cost locations, which is unlikely for China’s OFDI since
China’s labor cost is comparatively low, and hence is not considered here [10]. When comparing
these different theoretical motivations of OFDI activity, China has used OFDI to seek domestically
scarce resources, such as petroleum, fishery, timber, and minerals [10,18–21]. Buckley et al. [10] argued
that China’s OFDI is significantly positively related to host natural resources, but insignificantly
associated with patents as proxy of strategic asset. Cheung and Qian [13], Kolstad and Wiig [14],
and Wang et al. [11] also argued that natural resources are significantly positively associated with
China’s OFDI. Chang [22] claimed that China’s OFDI prefers to invest in the host country’s fuel
resources. Thus, OFDI from China has typically been considered as natural resource-seeking.
Internalization theory supports a positive association between China’s OFDI and the natural
resource endowment of the host countries [10,23]. This paper focuses on the resource-seeking
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motivation of China’s OFDI under the OBOR initiative. The more resources the host countries have,
the greater China’s OFDI. This relationship might be strengthened by the OBOR initiative and become
more prominent in the OBOR countries after 2013. Thus, our first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1. The OBOR initiative boosts the resource-seeking motivation of OFDI from China in OBOR countries.
2.2. Market-Seeking
Market-seeking is regarded as an important motivation of China’s OFDI. Numerous
studies [24–28] show that FDI has been directed toward larger market sizes for the economies of
scale and efficient utilization of resources. Buckley et al. [10] found a significantly positive association
between China’s OFDI and host market size. Cheung and Qian [13] and Chang [22] also found
that horizontal market-oriented FDI is attracted by the market size of the host country. Large
economies present more opportunities for China’s OFDI to generate profits than small economies.
The market-seeking hypothesis holds that larger host markets can attract more FDI from China.
The positive association between market size and China’s OFDI might be strengthened by the OBOR
initiative and become more significant in the OBOR countries after 2013. Thus, our second hypothesis
is as follows:
Hypothesis 2. The OBOR initiative boosts the market-seeking motivation of OFDI from China in OBOR countries.
2.3. Infrastructure-Led Outward Foreign Direct Investment
Previous studies show that infrastructure improvement in the host countries, such as the
transportation, information, and communication networks, can attract more FDI. Therefore, China
needs to upgrade its industry structure, especially for the infrastructure construction industry,
which has surplus capacity. If the OBOR initiative was mainly an infrastructure-led integration
scheme, the massive investment from China could develop infrastructure in the OBOR countries,
and in turn attract more FDI from China. Coughlin et al. [29] found that the U.S., with extensive
transportation infrastructure, could have received more FDI in 1981–1983. Additionally, developing
countries could improve infrastructure quality to attract OFDI from the U.S. [30]. Similarly,
Cheng and Kwan [31] argued that the density of roads is important for inward FDI in China. More
reports confirm the positive association between infrastructure improvement and FDI [32–36].
Infrastructure also plays a central role in international cooperation and development under the
OBOR initiative, as most of the OBOR countries are substantially short of infrastructure investment [2].
Busse et al. [7] found that China has established and improved much-needed infrastructure in
Africa, thereby decreasing transaction costs and enhancing trade and growth rates. Thus, better
infrastructure in the developed non-OBOR host countries can complement China’s OFDI, whereas
worse infrastructure in the underdeveloped OBOR countries also attracts infrastructure-led FDI from
China. We examined the effect of infrastructure on China’s OFDI by considering the infrastructure
distances of host countries from China under the OBOR initiative. The larger the infrastructure distance,
the more China’s OFDI invested in the host country. The relationship between the infrastructure
improvement and FDI might be strengthened by the OBOR initiative and become more prominent for
the OBOR countries after 2013, which is hypothesized as follows:
Hypothesis 3. The OBOR initiative boosts infrastructure-led OFDI from China in OBOR countries.
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2.4. Institution-Based Outward Foreign Direct Investment
As the second largest FDI inflow/outflow country while also a developing country, China has
a different institutional environment from developed countries and regions with large FDI inflow/outflow,
such as Hong Kong SAR, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Some empirical
studies examined the institutional pattern of China’s OFDI, and analyzed differences from the
host countries. Calvo et al. [37], Femandez-Arias [38], and Femandez-Arias and Montiel [39] identified
the social and political conditions in host countries as potential determinants of FDI decisions.
Fedderke and Romm [36] addressed policy-related factors including corporate tax, product market
regulations, openness, trade barriers, and non-policy factors including political and economic stability.
Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis [40] noted that trade, exchange market regulations, and business or
investment climate are important for FDI inflow. Buckley et al. [10] regarded policy liberalization and
political risk as the important determinants of China’s OFDI. They found that China’s OFDI is positively
associated with policy liberalization in China after 1992 and the political stability in the host countries.
Wang et al. [11] showed that institutions and taxation both matter in China’s OFDI.
However, Cheung and Qian [13] argued that institutional quality is insignificant in determining
FDI. Kolstad and Wiig [14] argued that, as a host country’s institutional environment worsens, China’s
OFDI becomes more attracted by its natural resources. Amighini et al. [12] found that China’s OFDI is
associated with weak governance in low-income countries. Thus, the more stable the political situation,
the more liberal the policy, and the better the governance of the developed host countries, the more
China’s OFDI is attracted. Conversely, worse institutional environment and weak governance of the
developing host countries could also be considered as an advantage associated with China’s OFDI.
Following this tradition of studies on institution-based OFDI, this paper uses a similar framework
to more systematically analyze institutional determinants of China’s OFDI and focuses on how the
institutional distances of host countries influence China’s OFDI. Given the OBOR initiative can
considerably reduce the institutional distance of the OBOR countries for Chinese investors through
international policy coordination and cooperation, and prevent them from taking advantage of the
local institutional environment, our fourth hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 4. The OBOR initiative reduces the institution-based OFDI from China in OBOR countries.
2.5. Cultural Distance
Chinese culture believes in harmony in diversity, which is an ancient philosophical system based
on mutual benefit and interest for people from different cultural backgrounds. Since 1979, cultural
connection with Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia has
helped China integrate into the world economy, especially by the inflow FDI from these countries
and regions [41–44]. Buckley et al. [10] suggested that cultural distance is a negative determinant of
China’s OFDI, as the cultural proximity of host countries can increase FDI from China. As the OBOR
initiative focuses not only on China’s economic integration into the global economy, but also on the
cultural communication and convergence with the world, the OBOR initiative might mitigate the
negative effects of cultural distance and increase China’s OFDI in the OBOR countries. Hence, we have
a hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 5. The OBOR initiative mitigates the negative effect of cultural distance on OFDI from China in
OBOR countries.
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3. Data Description and Measurement
3.1. Dependent Variable
This paper investigates whether and how the OBOR initiative influences China’s OFDI by using
data from 2010 to 2015. The dependent variable is China’s OFDI net flows (total OFDI outflows with net
counter-investment of less than 10%) to 216 sample countries, including 49 land belt (OB) countries, 25 sea
road (OR) countries, and 142 non-OBOR countries. This is a full sample published by the Chinese Ministry
of Commerce in the detailed Statistical Bulletin every year (Table 1), and the largest sample in the studies on
this subject, to our knowledge. The dependent variable was measured as a natural logarithm of real net
China’s OFDI (lnrofdi) in millions of US dollars in 2010. We used the GDP deflator provided by the World
Bank to deflate the nominal values. Since the real OFDI net flows could be negative values (for example, the
minimum value of the real OFDI net flows was $10,177.16 million in 2010) or zero (no OFDI), we set the
natural logarithm values of these cases as 0, i.e., lnrofdi = 0. It is equivalent to top up to $1 million for these
68 extreme cases with negative OFDI values and 424 cases with no OFDI. This assumption is commonly
used in the related literature to facilitate logarithmic transformation [1,45,46].
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables: 1296 observations from 216 countries during 2010–2015.
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Data Source
Dependent variable
lnrofdib Natural logarithm of real FDI net flows 2.35 2.52 −3.95 11.25 Chinese Ministry of Commerce
Main explanatory variables
nr Share of natural resource rent in GDP (%) 7.40 11.49 0.00 60.83 World Development Indicators(World Bank)
lnrgdp Natural logarithm of real GDP 23.77 2.38 17.22 30.44 ibid
fd Index, higher value = more infrastructure distance from China 0.85 0.51 0.00 3.49 ibid
cinfra Factor, higher value = better infrastructure facilities in China 0.11 0.19 −0.16 0.46 ibid
infra Factor, higher value = better infrastructure facilities 0.00 0.98 −1.06 3.51 ibid
lnairf Log form air transport freight (million ton-km) 2.61 2.95 0.00 10.59 ibid
rd Railway density, this is total railway kilometers (% of country area) 1.32 3.16 0.00 28.01 ibid
Internet Individuals using a landline phone (% of population) 42.00 29.13 0.00 98.32 ibid
broadband Individuals using a mobile phone (% of population) 11.72 13.17 0.00 61.74 ibid
mobile Individuals using the Internet (% of population) 100.03 42.82 1.14 324.44 ibid
landline Fixed broadband subscriptions (% of population) 20.54 20.43 0.00 141.18 ibid
id Index, higher value = more institutional distance from China 0.86 0.67 0.00 2.41 Worldwide Governance Indicators(World Bank)
cwgi Factor, higher value = better institutional quality in China −0.43 0.06 −0.50 −0.34 ibid
wgi Factor, higher value = better institutional quality 0.00 0.99 −2.28 1.93 ibid
ge Government effectiveness 0.07 1.04 −2.45 2.24 ibid
rq Regulatory quality 0.07 1.04 −2.53 2.26 ibid
cc Control of corruption 0.08 1.05 −1.77 2.40 ibid
ps Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 0.01 0.98 −3.13 1.94 ibid
va Voice and accountability 0.06 1.02 −2.26 1.74 ibid
rl Rule of law 0.07 1.05 −2.42 2.10 ibid
cd Index, higher value = more cultural distance from China 3.24 1.47 0.16 8.16 Hofstadter-insights website
pdi Power distance, higher values = higher inequality 63.37 19.73 11.00 100.00 ibid
idv Individualism/Collectivism, higher values = more individualism 40.78 25.01 6.00 91.00 ibid
mas Masculinity/Femininity, higher values = more masculine 48.50 15.81 5.00 100.00 ibid
uai Uncertainty avoidance, higher values = more uncertainty avoiding 60.12 19.24 8.00 100.00 ibid
lts Long-term/short-term, higher values = more short-term orientation 39.36 21.15 0.00 100.00 ibid
ivr Indulgence/restraint, higher values = more indulgent 52.09 22.32 0.00 100.00 ibid
Dipyear Years of formal diplomatic relationship 33.20 18.81 0.00 66.00 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Control variables
dbi Ease of doing business index 61.72 13.78 20.24 91.24 Doing Business (World Bank)
lab Labor force (% population) 45.13 11.50 19.90 140.18 World Development Indicators(World Bank)
indserv Economic structure (industry to service ratio) 0.65 1.88 0.00 39.84 ibid
Weights
pop Population 2.67 × 107 9.44 × 107 10,025 1.31 × 109 ibid
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3.2. Main Explanatory Variables
First of all, the natural resource (nr) endowment is measured as the share of natural resource
rent in GDP (%), provided by the World Development Indicators [47]. Estimates of this variable
rely on methods and sources of the World Bank [48]. Higher values of this variable suggest
more natural resource endowment and more dependence on natural resources in the host country.
Aleksynska and Havrylchyk [49] argued that countries with rich natural resources can increase their
FDI inflows. Thus, we expected the nr endowment would have a significantly positive effect on
China’s OFDI. Additionally, we measured the market size as the natural logarithm of real GDP (lnrgdp).
The GDP deflator provided by the World Development Indicators [47] was used to deflate the nominal
GDP into U.S. dollars in 2010. This variable can reflect the absorptive capacity or market potential of
the host country, so was expected to have significantly positive effects on China’s OFDI.
Second, infrastructure facilities—like airports, railways, telecommunication, and Internet
access—are important determinants of FDI. We used six variables of infrastructure facilities in the host
countries: (1) lnairf—log form air transport freight (million ton-km); (2) rd—railway density, which is
total railway kilometers (% of country area); (3) landline—individuals using landline phone (% of
population); (4) mobile—individuals using a mobile phone (% of population); (5) Internet—individuals
using the internet (% of population); and (6) broadband—fixed broadband subscriptions (% of
population). These variables were also derived from World Development Indicators data [47].
Exploratory factor analysis of these six variables using all 216 host countries and China showed
that one principal component with an eigenvalue of 2.9 accounted for 74% of the variance and the
loadings on this component were all around or exceeded 0.3: lnairf (0.292), rd (0.383), landline (0.888),
mobile (0.972), internet (0.520), and broadband (0.870). The overall Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure
of sampling adequacy was 0.764, which is more than 0.7 and suggested a good factor analysis. A factor
of infrastructure facilities (infra) was derived from these six variables for all 216 host countries and
China, which varied from −1.065 (weak) to 3.51(strong), indicating improvement of infrastructure
facilities. Next, we determined the factor value of China over the period of 2010–2015 as the baseline
of infrastructure facility variable (cinfra). The infrastructure facility distance variable (fd) is the absolute
difference between the infrastructure facility variables of host countries (infra) and China (cinfra),
that is, fd = |infra–cinfra|.
Third, we measured institutional quality using data from Worldwide Governance Indicators [50].
A factor of institutional quality (wgi) was calculated using six social and political governance variables
that reveal the overall profiles of host countries’ political situations: (1) government effectiveness
(ge), (2) regulatory quality (rq), (3) control of corruption (cc), (4) political stability and absence of
violence/terrorism (ps), (5) voice and accountability (va), and (6) rule of law (rl). These variables all
varied from −2.5 to 2.5 (i.e., weak to strong), indicating improvement of institutional quality in the
host countries.
Exploratory factor analysis of these six variables using all 216 host countries and China showed
that one principal component with an eigenvalue of 4.45 accounted for 83% of the variance and that
loadings on this component all exceeded 0.75: ge (0.9611), rq (0.928), cc (0.9629), ps (0.7521), va (0.8325),
and rl (0.9849). The overall KMO measure was 0.892 for the sampling adequacy, which is close to 0.9
and suggested a good factor analysis. Thus, a factor of worldwide governance indicators (wgi) was
derived from these six variables for all 216 host countries and China, which varied from −2.28 (weak)
to 1.93 (strong), indicating improvement in institutional quality. In addition, we determined the
factor value for China over the period of 2010 to 2015 as the baseline of institution variable (cwgi).
The institutional distance variable (id) was the absolute difference between the institution variables of
host countries (wgi) and China (cwgi), that is, id = |wgi—cwgi|.
Finally, cultural distance of the host countries from China was measured as an index (cd) derived
from the six cultural dimensions in Hofstede [51,52]: (1) power distance (pdi), where higher values mean
higher inequality; (2) individualism/collectivism (idv), where higher values denote more individualism;
(3) masculinity/femininity (mas), where higher values denote more masculinity; (4) uncertainty
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avoidance (uai), where higher values mean more uncertainty avoidance; (5) long-term/short-term
(lts), where higher values indicate more short-term orientation; and (6) indulgence/restraint (inr),
where higher values denote more indulgence. From Hofstede’s six-dimension culture dataset
on the Hofstede-insights website, Chinese culture is highly unequal (pdi = 80), more collective
(idv = 20), highly masculine (mas = 66), uncertainty tolerant (uai = 30), long-term oriented (lts = 87),
and very restricted (inr = 24). We measured the cultural distance index (cd) by extending the
Kogut and Singh’s [53] model (also Fu et al. [54])
cdjt =
6
∑
i=1
[(Cij − Ci,China)2/Vi]/6+ 1Tjt (1)
where cdjt is the cultural distance index of a host country j in year t, Cij is the ith cultural dimension in
jth country, Ci,China is the ith cultural dimension in China, Vi stands for the variance of the ith cultural
dimension, and Tjt is the years of a formal diplomatic relationship with China for country j in year t
(provided by Ministry of Foreign Affairs) [55] to capture the cultural communication and convergence
process. Hong Kong uses 1997 and Macau uses 1999 as the beginning year. For those countries/regions
without a formal diplomatic relationship with China, we assumed Tjt to be 0.5 years to allow the
inverse of Tjt in Equation (1). Higher values of cdjt indicate more cultural distance of host countries
from China. We also tried the exploratory factor analysis for these six variables. However, one principal
component with an eigenvalue of 1.68 only accounted for 51.8% of the variance. In addition, most of
the loadings on this component were less than 30%. The overall KMO measure was only 0.531 for
sampling adequacy, suggesting a complex pattern of national culture against factor analysis
3.3. Control Variables
We controlled the business regulations and their enforcement in the host countries by using
the Doing Business data from the World Bank [56], which provides objective measures of business
regulations and their enforcement according to 10 sets of indicators. These are combined into an
overall ease of the doing business index (dbi), with higher values suggesting better business regulations
and enforcement. Better business environment in the host countries is supposed to attract more FDI
from China [36,40]. Hence, the above institutional quality variable (wgi) mainly concerns the political
governance situations, while the doing business index mainly concerns the business governance
situations in the host countries.
We also controlled the labor force (lab, % population), the economic structure (indserv, a ratio of
an industrial sector to a service sector), OBOR country dummy (obor = 1 for OBOR countries) and
OBOR year dummy (post = 1 for the years after 2013). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of all
dependent variables, main explanatory variables, and control variables.
4. Methodology
Following the above discussion, the log-linear ordinary least square (OLS) estimation based on an
expanded gravity model for determinants of China’s OFDI [10,54] was written as
lnrofdijt = α0 + α1nrjt + α2lnrgdpjt + α3fdjt + α4idjt + α5cdjt + α6Xjt + Yt + εjt (2)
where China’s OFDI into the host country j in year t could be positively associated with natural
resources (α1 > 0), market size (α2 > 0), infrastructure facilities distance (α3 > 0), and institutional
distance (α4 > 0), but negatively associated with cultural distance (α5 < 0) of host countries. In addition,
for control variables in the vector of Xjt, better business environment and more labor resources in the
host countries could encourage China’s OFDI. The industrialization of the host countries might have
a competition relationship with Chinese investment, which would have a negative effect on FDI.
We followed the existing literature [1,2,57,58], and employed the DID setting to estimate the
OBOR initiative’s effect on China’s OFDI and the year dummies to capture the dynamics of the
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macro-economy in a specific year. The two-year period from 2014 to 2015 was the post-initiative
period (OBOR initiative dummy, post = 1), and correspondingly, the three-year period of 2010–2013
was the pre-initiative period (post = 0). The two-year period from 2014 to 2015 should be long enough
for Chinese investors to adjust their investment patterns in response to the announcement of the
OBOR initiative.
We also constructed country dummies of OB, OR, and OBOR, and used the non-OBOR countries
as a baseline group. The absence of OBOR policy for these non-OBOR countries provides a meaningful
control group for China’s OFDI. Hence, we could control the global trend in China’s OFDI in our
regression analysis. Table A1 and Figure A1 in the Appendix show the list of the OB (49), OR (25),
and non-OBOR (142) countries. The DID estimation equation is specified as
lnrofdijt = β0 + β1OBORj + β2OBORjpost + β3nrjt + β4lnrgdpjt + β5fdjt + β6idjt +
β7cdjt + β8Xjt + Yt + εjt
(3)
where β1 reflects the effect of OBOR countries compared with non-OBOR countries before the initiative,
β2 reflects the incremental effect of OBOR countries after the initiative, and the effect of non-OBOR
after initiative is reflected into the separated term post in regression to capture the spillovers of OBOR
initiative which is absorbed by year dummies. The OBOR initiative might have been based on a better
investment history in the OBOR countries than those outside even before the initiative, so β1 > 0 was
expected. China’s OFDI in the host country j in year t could be positively associated with OBOR
initiative, so we expected β2 > 0. In order to test Hypotheses 1–5, we inserted dummies of OBOR
and OBOR*post with natural resource endowment, market size, infrastructure facilities distance,
institutional distance, and cultural distance, which was shown as
lnrofdijt = β0 + β1OBORj + β2OBORj × post + β31nrjt + β32nrjt × OBORj + β33nrjt × OBORj × post
+ β41lnrgdpjt + β42lnrgdpjt × OBORj + β43lnrgdpjt × OBORj × post
+ β51fdjt + β52fdjt × OBORj + β53fdjt × OBORj × post
+ β61idjt + β62idjt × OBORj + β63idjt × OBORj × post
+ β71cdjt + β72cdjt × OBORj + β73cdjt × OBORj × post
+ β8Xjt + Yt + εjt
(4)
According to Hypotheses 1–5, β33, β43, β53, β63, and β73 were expected to be positive. The OLS
method was adopted to estimate the DID, in Equations (3) and (4). These estimations were weighted by the
population of each country (pop), which is a standard approach to account for country heterogeneity [59].
In the above DID estimation, we assumed that the selection of OBOR countries was
random. To correct the potential selection biases addressed by investment and international trade
literature [60–64], we combined the above DID approach with propensity score matching (PSM)
techniques to estimate the causal impacts of the OBOR initiative on China’s OFDI. The evaluation of
a treatment effect of the OBOR initiative involved comparing China’s actual OFDI outcome with the
counterfactual situation, where the OBOR countries were not included in the OBOR initiative, and was
written as
E(OFDIpost1 − OFDIpost0|Xt−1,OBORt = 1) = E(OFDIpost1|Xt−1,OBORt = 1) −
E(OFDIpost0|Xt−1,OBORt = 1)
(5)
where OFDIpost1 stands for the China’s OFDI in an OBOR country during the post-initiative period
of 2014–2015 after the treatment year of t; OFDIpost0 is China’s OFDI if it is not an OBOR country;
Xt−1 contains the set of is a dummy variable of countries being included in the OBOR initiative
in year t.
However, the counterfactual performance OFDIpost0 is unobservable. To construct a comparable
baseline group of host countries and reduce the dimensionality problem, we relied on
Rosenbaum and Rubin’s [65] approach to use the probability included in the OBOR initiative
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(OBORt = 1) conditional on the ex-ante characteristics of countries (Xt−1), which includes the pre-entry
characteristics of a country, captured by the main explanatory variables and control variables in period
t − 1 [66]. A logit model was implemented to predict the probability of being selected as an OBOR
country as the propensity score and was described as
P(OBORt = 1|Xt−1) = Λ(βˆXt−1) (6)
where the cumulative logistic probability function is represented as Λ.
According to the propensity score, each OBOR country was matched to an actual non-OBOR
country using the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching method. Hence, we combined the DID
setting with the matching techniques and relaxed the strong assumption of random selection [67].
This allowed the OBOR initiative to be based on the expected pre-entry characteristics of a country
and on an unobservable time-invariant [68]. Therefore, the DID estimator was expressed as
PSMDID = E(OFDIpost1 − OFDIt−11|Xt−1,OBORt = 1) − E(OFDIpost0 −
OFDIt−10|Xt−1,OBORt = 0)
(7)
Equation (7) can be operationalized by estimating a regression equation including all main
explanatory and control variables as
∆lnrofdij,post = β0 + β1OBORjt + β2nrjt + β3lnrgdpjt + β4fdjt + β5idjt + β6cdjt
+ β7Xjt + Yt + εit
(8)
where ∆lnrofdij,post denotes the changes in China’s real log form OFDI in the host country j after the
OBOR initiative year t, and β denotes the effect of the OBOR initiative on China’s OFDI, which is
estimated by applying the population-weighted OLS regression of Equation (3) to the matched dataset.
5. Empirical Results
5.1. Baseline Results
Table 2 presents the baseline results of the estimation using Equations (2)–(4). The first column
is a simplified specification only including dummies of OBOR, OBOR*post, and years. China’s OFDI
in the OBOR countries was about 40% higher than in the non-OBOR countries before the initiative,
suggesting a good foundation of international investment in these countries. After the initiative,
China’s OFDI increased by 46.2% in the OBOR countries. These results revealed that the OBOR
initiative has better stimulated China’s OFDI in these related countries after the announcement in
2013 compared with other countries outside the OBOR group, which is consistent with the findings
reported by Liu et al. [3] and Du and Zhang [1].
As Column (2) adds the main explanatory variables to the regression using Equation (3) and
the coefficient of OBOR becomes significantly negative (−39.2%), China’s higher OFDI in the
OBOR countries before the initiative in Column (1) is actually due to the variation in the main
explanatory variables across two country groups. The significant difference between the OBOR and
non-OBOR countries also supports the application of the matching DID approach in the next section.
The OBOR*post coefficient did not change greatly (42.2%), demonstrating the positive policy effect of
the OBOR initiative still holds for China’s OFDI. Moreover, resource-seeking motivation was significant
for China’s OFDI. With the share of natural resource rent in GDP increased by 1% in the host countries,
FDI from China would have increased by 4.4%, which is consistent with the existing literature that
considered China’s OFDI highly resource-motivated [13,14,22]. China’s OFDI was also motivated by
market-seeking, as a 1% increase in market size increased China’s OFDI by 0.677%.
Infrastructure facility distance is able to well attract China’s OFDI. A one-point increase in
infrastructure facility distance from China, that is, a standard deviation of the infrastructure facility
factor (infra), improved the OFDI from China by 64.8%. This suggested that China tended to
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invest in countries with greater infrastructure facility distance. Since we defined the infrastructure
facility distance variable (fd) as the absolute difference between host countries and China, either
better or worse infrastructure in the host countries could well attract China’s OFDI. Existing
literature [31,69–71] confirms that better infrastructure of the host countries means better investment
environment, which has a positive effect on FDI inflow. On the other hand, Liu et al. [3] and
Du and Zhang [1] argued that China’s OFDI is so infrastructure-led that China’s foreign investments
are mainly large infrastructure construction projects. Hence, a host country that lacks infrastructure
facilities brings more opportunity to China, especially for those poor countries with less technology
and fewer finance channels for large infrastructure projects. Thus, the infrastructure facility distance
(either better or worse) of host countries from China has a positive effect on China’s OFDI.
Table 2. Effects of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) policy announcement on China’s outward foreign
direct investment (OFDI), 2010–2015.
Dependent Variable: Log form China’s OFDI (1) (2) (3) (4)
OBOR 0.400 *** −0.392 *** −0.179 6.967 ***
(0.148) (0.134) (0.132) (1.721)
OBOR *post 0.462 * 0.422 ** 0.391 ** −4.843 **
(0.252) (0.191) (0.184) (2.087)
Natural resource 0.044 *** 0.062 *** 0.070 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Market size 0.677 *** 0.642 *** 0.708 ***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.047)
Infrastructure distance
0.648 *** 1.029 *** 1.197 ***
(0.140) (0.141) (0.232)
Institutional distance
0.323 *** −0.131 0.199
(0.109) (0.116) (0.169)
Cultural distance
−0.288 *** −0.259 *** −0.350 ***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.067)
Doing business 0.014 ** 0.013 **
(0.006) (0.006)
Labor force
0.052 *** 0.057 ***
(0.007) (0.007)
Industry/service −0.088 −0.076
(0.058) (0.057)
nr*OBOR −0.011
(0.012)
nr*OBOR*post −0.027
(0.018)
lnrgdp*OBOR −0.265 ***
(0.062)
lnrgdp*OBOR*post 0.185 **
(0.077)
fd*OBOR 0.009
(0.348)
fd*OBOR*post 0.366
(0.384)
id*OBOR −1.139 ***
(0.270)
id*OBOR*post −0.003
(0.308)
cd*OBOR 0.341 ***
(0.102)
cd*OBOR*post −0.055
(0.139)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.029 0.445 0.485 0.519
N 1296 1296 1296 1296
Notes: Parentheses below the estimated coefficients present their estimated standard errors. Estimations are
weighted by population of each country (pop). ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
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Institutional distance can also attract China’s OFDI. A one-point increase in institutional distance
from China, that is, a standard deviation of the institutional quality factor (wgi), attracted more
OFDI from China by 32.3%. Hence, China’s OFDI preferred countries with institutional distance.
Many authors, such as Buckley et al. [10], found a positive association between high institutional
quality and China’s OFDI. On the contrary, Amighini et al. [12] argued that the weak governance of
low-income countries encourages Chinese FDI. China’s OFDI might take advantage of low-quality
institutions of host countries to obtain the privileges in terms of resources, markets, and infrastructure
projects [1]. Hence, a host country that lacks high-quality institutions might present more opportunities
for China’s OFDI, which indicates the positive effect of institutional distance on institution-based OFDI
from China into the host countries.
However, cultural distance of the host countries has a significantly negative effect on China’s OFDI.
A one-point increase in cultural distance from China decreased China’s OFDI by 28.8%. This confirms
the previously reported cultural proximity as a positive determinant of China’s OFDI [10,41–44].
Therefore, the results in Column (2) supported the motivations of both resource-seeking and
market-seeking in Hypotheses 1 and 2, the positive effect of infrastructure facility distance and
institutional distance in Hypotheses 3 and 4, and the negative effect of cultural distance in Hypothesis 5.
Column (3) adds the control variables to the regression using Equation (3). The main change is
that the institutional distance variable becomes insignificant, the positive effect of which is captured
by the doing business index (dbi). A one-point increase in dbi more strongly attracted China’s OFDI by
1.4%, so a standard deviation increase in dbi (13.78 points in Table 1) increased China’s OFDI by 19.3%.
It suggested that China tended to invest in better business environments, regardless of their political
governance, and Chinese multinationals are more sensitive to business governance than political
institutional quality.
Liu et al. [3] provided two reasons for China’s OFDI being indifferent to host countries’ political
instability. First, as the main driving force of China’s OFDI being guided by the government,
the investment behavior of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is motivated by both profit and
political overtones. Hence, in countries with higher political risk, government support may effectively
compensate for Chinese SOEs’ investment loss [72]. Second, the political relations between China
and potential hosts affect firms’ FDI. Countries with long-term relationships tend to attract more
FDI [73], whereas these countries might not have high-quality political institutions. For instance,
African countries with long-term political relationships with China have improved their economic
relationship since 2000 and have more strongly attracted China’s OFDI [7]. Thus, China’s OFDI might
prefer better business environments to better political governance.
In addition, labor force is considered as a kind of resource of the host countries. As China’s
domestic labor costs keep rising, the rich labor force in the host country may motivate these
resource-seeking investors from China. With a 1% increase in labor force proportion of host countries,
Chinese FDI increased by 5.2%. When the labor cost increases in China, the efficiency-seeking motive
might become stronger in China’s OFDI. However, we have no data for wage costs for each country
in this study. The labor force variable here was rather like a resource-seeking measure than an
efficiency-seeking measure. However, the economic structure had no significant effect on Chinese FDI.
5.2. Hypothesis Testing
Using the DID estimation results in Column (4) of Table 2, we tested Hypotheses 1–5. First of all,
there was no evidence that the OBOR initiative boosted the resource-seeking motivation of OFDI from
China. The resource-seeking motivation was still significantly positive for the non-OBOR countries
(nr, 7%), but there was no significant difference between OBOR and non-OBOR countries before
(nr*OBOR, −1.1%, insignificant) and after (nr*OBOR*post, −2.7%, close to 10% significance level).
This finding is in line with Liu et al.’s [3] conclusion that China’s OFDI does not see OBOR countries
as natural resources providers. The negative sign and proximity to the 10% significance level for the
coefficient of the after-initiative interaction even suggests the OBOR initiative has, to some degree,
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reduced the resource-seeking motivation of China’s OFDI in the OBOR countries. Thus, Hypothesis 1
for the initiative’s boosting effect on the resource-seeking motivation in the OBOR countries was not
supported by our study.
Second, the OBOR initiative boosted Chinese market-seeking motivation in the OBOR countries.
The market-seeking motivation was significantly positive for the non-OBOR countries (lnrgdp, 0.708).
However, the market-seeking motivation of China’s OFDI was significantly lower in the OBOR
countries before the initiative (−0.265), which was strengthened by the OBOR initiative after 2013
(0.185). Liu et al. [3] also argued that China’s OFDI in the OBOR countries was mainly motivated by
market-seeking and domestic manufacturing capacity transfer. Thus, Hypothesis 2 of the initiative’s
boosting effect on the market-seeking motivation was supported by evidence in the OBOR countries.
Third, the OBOR initiative does not appear to boost the positive effect of infrastructure distance
on Chinese OFDI in the OBOR countries. The infrastructure distance had a significantly positive
effect on China’s OFDI in the non-OBOR countries (fd, 1.197). However, there was no significant
increase for interactions with dummies for OBOR countries (fd*OBOR, 0.009, insignificant) for years
after the initiative (fd*OBOR*post, 0.366, insignificant). This indicates that the positive effect of
infrastructure distance on the OBOR countries was not significantly different from the non-OBOR
countries, either before or after the initiative. Infrastructure distance of host countries, either further
or shorter, in the OBOR or non-OBOR countries, similarly attracted China’s OFDI. For instance,
the developed non-OBOR countries, such as the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Switzerland attracted
Chinese investment by using their better infrastructure environment, whereas developing OBOR
countries, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan, provided more investment opportunities.
Hence, foreign investment with the Chinese government’s stimulus packages—such as financial
support and Chinese currency (RMB) settlement—may not be outlets in the OBOR countries after
initiative implementation to absorb the excess productivity of the Chinese construction industry.
The OBOR policy had no significantly complementary effect on the infrastructure facilities in the
OBOR host countries, so did not lead to more investment in that country. Thus, Hypothesis 3 of the
boosting effect of the OBOR initiative with infrastructure-led China’s OFDI in the OBOR countries was
not supported by our study.
Fourth, China’s OFDI has been positively related to the institutional distance in the non-OBOR
countries (19.9%) as expected by institution-based theory. The positive effect of political institutional
distance might be partially captured by the doing business index (1.3%), so it was not significant
here. The institution-based OFDI was significantly lower in the OBOR countries before and after the
initiative (−1.139), whereas the OBOR initiative after 2013 did not add any significant increase in
China’s OFDI in these countries. Hence, Chinese investors have not taken advantage of the OBOR
countries’ institutional environment before or after the initiative, suggesting the existence of a good
foundation of institutional cooperation. China’s OFDI is not institution-based in the OBOR countries,
and the larger institutional distance has actually impeded OFDI from China. International policy
coordination and cooperation under the OBOR initiative aim to reduce the political uncertainty
and risks in the OBOR countries. It was found that the reduction in the institutional distance of
OBOR countries could increase Chinese FDI in these countries, supporting the mitigating effect on
institution-based OFDI in Hypothesis 4.
Finally, cultural distance was significantly negative in the non-OBOR countries (cd, −35%) as
expected given previous reports such as Buckley et al. [10]. The negative effect of cultural distance was
significantly lower in the OBOR countries, both before (34.1%) and after the initiative (−5.5%, which is
insignificantly different from pre-initiative period). This suggested that even the cultural distance has
a significantly negative effect on China’s OFDI in the OBOR countries. The long history of cultural
communication between China and these OBOR countries has been helpful for Chinese oversea
investment by alleviating the negative effect of cultural distance. The OBOR initiative might not have
increased the cultural convergence in the short term, but it is a continuation of the long ‘harmony in
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diversity’ tradition of cultural communication with these OBOR countries. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was
supported by our study.
We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting the potential endogeneity issue in
our estimation. We estimated the results in Table 2 by using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM),
where lagged values of the explanatory variables of infrastructure distance, institutional distance,
and cultural distance were used as instruments. The GMM IV results were not significantly different
from the ones presented in Table 2. In all estimated equations, whereas the Hansen J statistics were
insignificant and suggested valid instruments, and C statistics were also insignificant and indicated
efficiency loss in GMM IV results. Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we present only OLS
estimation results. Interested readers can contact the authors for instrumented results.
5.3. Results by Country Group
DID results by groups of OB, OR, and non-OBOR countries are presented in Table 3. Columns (1)
and (2) replace the OBOR dummy with dummies for OB and OR countries, and re-estimate the effect of
the OBOR initiative on China’s OFDI by using Equation (3). Hence, the OBOR countries are classified
into the land belt (OB) countries and the sea road (OR) countries. We found that China’s OFDI was
significantly higher in the OR countries before (60.3%) and after (57.6%) the initiative. All main
explanatory and control variables had similar results to those in Table 2.
Table 3. Effects of OBOR policy announcement on China’s OFDI by country group.
Dependent Variable: Log Form China’s OFDI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All OB OR Non-OBOR
OB
−0.077 −0.183
(0.197) (0.156)
OB *post 0.193 0.270
(0.337) (0.249)
OR
0.603 *** −0.146
(0.157) (0.153)
OR *post 0.576 ** 0.444 **
(0.268) (0.198)
Natural resource
0.063 *** 0.028 * 0.194 *** 0.059 ***
(0.006) (0.016) (0.040) (0.008)
Market size
0.634 *** 1.063 *** 0.322 *** 0.786 ***
(0.030) (0.078) (0.090) (0.045)
Infrastructure distance
0.984 *** 1.818 *** 0.914 ** 1.394 ***
(0.151) (0.339) (0.435) (0.205)
Institutional distance
−0.095 −1.898 *** −0.313 0.211
(0.125) (0.360) (0.372) (0.145)
Cultural distance
−0.259 *** −0.463 *** −0.338 ** −0.309 ***
(0.049) (0.149) (0.139) (0.058)
Doing business 0.015 ** 0.010 0.038 ** −0.003
(0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.008)
Labor force
0.052 *** 0.007 0.054 ** 0.037 ***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.022) (0.010)
Industry/service −0.092 −0.082 0.925 −0.092 *
(0.059) (0.539) (0.823) (0.049)
Year 2011
0.408 ** 0.242 * 0.285 0.432 −0.210
(0.199) (0.147) (0.324) (0.265) (0.203)
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Table 3. Cont.
Dependent Variable: Log Form China’s OFDI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All OB OR Non-OBOR
Year 2012
0.643 *** 0.505 *** 0.094 0.950 *** 0.112
(0.198) (0.147) (0.324) (0.269) (0.202)
Year 2013
0.470 ** 0.341 ** 0.104 0.657 ** 0.120
(0.197) (0.147) (0.325) (0.275) (0.202)
Year 2014
0.569 ** 0.514 *** 0.650 ** 1.199 *** 0.495 **
(0.255) (0.189) (0.328) (0.280) (0.201)
Year 2015
0.110 0.047 0.070 1.326 *** −0.467 **
(0.254) (0.192) (0.333) (0.322) (0.204)
Adjusted R-squared 0.049 0.484 0.517 0.498 0.602
N 1296 1296 294 150 852
Notes: Parentheses below the estimated coefficients present their estimated standard errors. Estimations are
weighted by population of each country (pop). ***, **, and * stand for significance levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Another scenario is presented separately in Columns (3)–(5) in Table 3 for the three country groups.
A significantly positive association between China’s OFDI and natural resources endowments was
found in all OB (2.8%), OR (19.4%), and non-OBOR (5.9%) countries, but obviously the resource-seeking
motivation was the most prominent in the OR countries. China’s OFDI in the OB countries (1.063) was
more market-seeking motivated than in the OR (0.322) and non-OBOR (0.786) countries. Moreover,
China’s OFDI was more infrastructure-led in the OB countries (1.818) than in the OR countries (0.914)
and non-OBOR countries (1.394). The effect of institutional distance on China’s OFDI was significantly
lower in the OB countries (−1.898) than in the OR countries and non-OBOR countries in which the
effects were insignificant. A significant negative relationship between China’s OFDI and cultural
distance was found in all OB (−46.3%), OR (−33.8%,) and non-OBOR (−30.9%) countries, but the
relationship was larger and more significant in the OB countries.
Next, for control variables, the doing business index was only significantly positive in the OR
countries (3.8%), but insignificant in the other two groups. Similar to natural resources, the labor
force was more significantly positive in the OR (5.4%) and non-OBOR (3.7%) countries than in the
OB countries (insignificant), suggesting more resource-seeking motivation. Industrialization showed
a significantly negative effect only in the non-OBOR countries (−9.2%), which may have a competitive
economic structure with China.
Finally, the year dummies captured the policy effect of the OBOR initiative. As shown in
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, the strongest effect was found in the OR countries, increasing from
0.95 in 2012 to 1.326 in 2015. There was only a temporary policy shock for the OB countries in
2014 (0.65), whereas the spill-over effects in the non-OBOR countries were lower in 2014 (0.495) and
quickly declined in the next year (−0.467). Therefore, we conclude that the OBOR initiative had
a more significantly positive effect on the maritime road (OR) countries. Du and Zhang [1] found that
China’s OFDI rose more significantly in countries along the continental route than the maritime road.
This finding is perhaps because they employed firm-level data from the China Global Investment
Tracker, which only includes investment projects more than USD $100 million. At the same time,
China’s OFDI in the OR countries is more natural resource- and labor-seeking and more sensitive to
doing business environment than in the OB countries.
The OBOR initiative only created a temporary policy shock for the continental belt (OB) and
non-OBOR countries. The long term and spill-over effects of the initiative in these countries still
requires more evidence. China’s OFDI in the OB countries is more market-seeking motivated,
more infrastructure-led, and more sensitive to institutional and cultural distance from China.
The OBOR initiative—which aimed to improve international political cooperation, policy coordination,
government support, and cultural communication—could have a more effective influence on Chinese
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FDI in the OB countries. These results also confirm the country heterogeneity and selection bias
problem in the policy study of the OBOR initiative, creating a call for better control of the DID
approach. Hence, in the next section, we employ PSM DID to perform the sensitivity tests for our
baseline results.
5.4. Matching and DID Results
5.4.1. Logit Estimation
We first estimated the probability of being selected as an OBOR country using the matching
equation shown in Equation (6). Table 4 presents the estimation results using the logit model.
All explanatory variables (except the year dummies) were lagged one year in the matching process to
provide more consistent estimates of coefficients [74,75].
Natural resources was negatively related to the probability of being selected as an OBOR country
(−0.016), whereas the market size was positively associated with the selection chance (0.57). This is
consistent with our findings that the OBOR initiative was not seeking natural resources providers,
but was more motivated by market-seeking and domestic manufacturing capacity transfer [3].
Infrastructure distance (−1.538) and cultural distance (−1.288) had a negative effect on the selection of
OBOR country, suggesting that infrastructure similarity and cultural proximity are important criteria
for the entry into the initiative. Additionally, the Chinese government’s selection was neither based on
political institutional distance nor business environment. Nor did the initiative aim to seek labor force
resources or complementary economic structures in the OBOR countries.
Table 4. Logit estimation using matching Equation (6), with a one-year lag for explanatory variables.
Dependent Variable: OBOR Countries Estimated Coefficient Standard Error
Natural resources (one-year lag) −0.016 ** 0.008
Market size (one-year lag) 0.570 *** 0.051
Infrastructure distance (one-year lag) −1.538 *** 0.243
Institutional distance (one-year lag) −0.039 0.189
Cultural distance (one-year lag) −1.288 *** 0.095
Business environment (one-year lag) 0.001 0.010
Labor force (one-year lag) −0.005 0.011
Industry/service (one-year lag) −0.018 0.045
Year dummy Yes
N 1080
Pseudo R2 0.4149
Notes: ***, **, and * respectively stand for significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
The purpose of the OBOR initiative is to create regional economic cooperation and joint prosperity.
Harmony and inclusiveness are basic principles, so the OBOR initiative is open and cooperative
in nature and does not exclude any interested parties [2]. It is not surprising that some interested
developed countries, such as Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Singapore,
are also included in the initiative. Therefore, the selection pattern of OBOR countries reflects two
sides of the harmony in diversity tradition. On the one hand, the Chinese government is seeking
partnership in terms of market cooperation, policy coordination of infrastructure facility, and further
cultural communication and convergence. This is called ‘qiú tóng’, which means seeking common
ground. On the other hand, the Chinese government’s selection is avoiding natural resource- and
labor-seeking, and allowing diversity in political and business institutions and economic structure.
This is called ‘cún yì’, which means reserving difference. Thus, the OBOR selection principle of seeking
common ground and reserving difference—in other words, agreeing to disagree—reflects the most
important tradition of harmony in diversity followed by the OBOR initiative.
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5.4.2. Matching Procedure
In order to examine the impact of the OBOR initiative on the China’s OFDI into the host countries,
we attempted to match each OBOR country with a non-OBOR country that had the most similar
propensity score. The balancing test results from the matching procedure are shown in Table 5. In order
to gauge the pre-entry difference between the OBOR and non-OBOR countries, the covariates of
the logit equation using the matched sample were compared with the unmatched sample. In this
paper, standardized differences between OBOR and the matched non-OBOR countries should be lower
compared to the un-matched sample. For instance, the bias in the lagged market size (L.lnrgdp) was
reduced by 74.9%. The bias of lagged cultural distance (L.cd) was reduced by 97.4%. A similar pattern
was also found for lagged labor force (L.lab, bias reduction 16.7%). For the overall propensity score
(_pscore), the bias was reduced by 99.9%, suggesting a good match overall.
For other explanatory and control variables, the selection biases were too small to be relevant
in the selection of OBOR countries. Selection biases were too small for variables such as the natural
resource (L.nr, 2.7%), doing business index (L.dbi, 6.4%), and economic structure (L.indser, 0.8%),
or changed little after matching, such as infrastructure facility distance (L.fd, −0.3%) and institutional
distance (L.id, −1.1%). Thus, these variables were basically random factors in the selection process
that did not need matching to correct the biases, or the matching approach could not reduce the biases
(Figure 2). This is consistent with our findings in Table 4, which showed that the Chinese government’s
selection was not based on political institutional distance or business environment. Neither did the
initiative aim to seek natural or labor resources nor complementary economic structure. The selection
was more concerned with the market potential and the cultural distance of the host countries.
Table 5. Balancing test for the matching process.
Variable Sample Treated Control % Bias Bias Reduction t p > t
L.nr Unmatched 7.9863 7.6545 2.7 0.43 0.665
Matched 8.063 7.5136 4.6 −65.6 0.65 0.515
L.lnrgdp Unmatched 25.063 23.116 91.6 13.81 0
Matched 24.989 25.478 −23 74.9 −3.27 0.001
L.fd Unmatched 0.70258 0.90019 −40.6 −6.19 0
Matched 0.69925 0.89736 −40.7 −0.3 −5.29 0
L.id Unmatched 0.73075 0.93162 −31.6 −4.72 0
Matched 0.74748 0.9506 −31.9 −1.1 −4.31 0
L.cd Unmatched 2.2601 3.7592 −122.9 −18.23 0
Matched 2.3008 2.2616 3.2 97.4 0.45 0.655
L.dbi Unmatched 61.933 61.092 6.4 0.95 0.344
Matched 62.109 67.954 −44.4 −594.9 −6.37 0
L.lab Unmatched 45.607 44.824 7.1 1.06 0.291
Matched 45.673 45.021 5.9 16.7 0.93 0.351
L.indserv Unmatched 0.66932 0.65671 0.8 0.1 0.918
Matched 0.66465 0.50292 9.6 −1182.3 1.42 0.156
_pscore Unmatched 0.65183 0.18144 197.4 31.33 0
Matched 0.6426 0.64307 −0.2 99.9 −0.03 0.98
These results were confirmed when performing t-tests for the equality of means in OBOR and
non-OBOR countries, without significant differences in the selection variables between the two
groups after matching. For instance, the difference in cultural distance (L.cd) between the OBOR and
non-OBOR countries was significant (p = 0.00) in the unmatched sample, but insignificant (p = 0.655) in
the matched sample. The test statistics showed that the propensity score (_pscore) differences between
the OBOR and non-OBOR countries was significant (p = 0.00) in the unmatched sample, but were small
and insignificant (0.98) between the OBOR countries (treatment group) and the matched non-OBOR
countries (control group). Hence, improvements in the estimation validity and reliability are mainly
due to the bias reduction of the cultural distance variable.
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Figure 2 depicts how the matching procedure reduced the selection biases by decreasing the
differences in the covariates between the matched and unmatched samples. The very similar propensity
score (_pscore) of the OBOR (treated) and non-OBOR (untreated) countries in the matched sample is
presented at the top of Figure 2, which is around the zero vertical line. However, its unmatched sample
is on the right-hand side of the zero vertical line. Obviously, the main improvement was due to the
cultural distance at the bottom (L.cd, unmatched at the left-hand side, matched at the vertical line)
and the market size at the top of Figure 2 (L.lnrgdp, unmatched at the right-hand side, matched at the
zero vertical line). For the other variables, the biases were too small, and hence, bias reduction could
be ignored. The comparison between the OBOR and non-OBOR countries in the matched sample
supports DID estimation on the treatment effect of the OBOR initiative. Hence, the propensity score
matching (PSM) should have provided a more valid and reliable comparison group of the non-OBOR
countries with the OBOR countries to estimate the impact of the OBOR initiative.Sustainability 2018, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW  20 of 27 
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5.4.3. Difference-in-Differences Estimation
We estimated Equation (8) by applying a population-weighted OLS regression in Equations (3)
and (4) to the matched dataset. Table 6 presents the results estimated using the matching DID method
for China’s OFDI. First of all, the coefficient significance of the OBOR dummies disappeared in
Column (1). This suggests that the OBOR initiative did not affect China’s OFDI if the economic,
institutional, and cultural characteristics of the non-OBOR countries were similar to those of the OBOR
countries. Hence, the OBOR initiative is a Chinese national strategy for economic integration and a
partnership with the selected OBOR countries.
Second, Column (2) adds the main explanatory variables to the regression using Equation (3).
The coefficient of the OBOR dummy was still significantly negative (−30.3%), as in Table 2, but
the coefficient of the interaction OBOR*post became insignificant. Resource-seeking (4.2%) and
market-seeking (0.679%) motivations were still significantly positive for China’s OFDI. Infrastructure
facility distance (74.4%) and institutional distance (23.9%) attracted more China’s OFDI, as cultural
distance still had a significantly negative effect on China’s OFDI (−24%).
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Third, Column (3) adds the control variables to the regression using Equation (3). Labor force was
still considered as a kind of endowment that more strongly attracts OFDI from China (4.6%). The main
change is that the significance of the coefficients of both institutional distance and doing business
variables disappeared. Additionally, the industrialization of host countries had a significantly negative
effect on Chinese FDI (−12.4%). China’s OFDI was insensitive to political and business governance
of the host countries, but was more sensitive to the competition of local industrialization if those
non-OBOR countries had similar characteristics to the OBOR countries. Thus, DID estimation using
the matched data did not change our basic conclusion, except that the effect of political and business
governance of the host countries was less effective, and complementary economic structure became
more important.
Table 6. Effects of OBOR policy announcement on China’s OFDI, matched sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OBOR
−0.065 −0.303 ** −0.086 7.771 ***
(0.172) (0.152) (0.152) (2.075)
OBOR*post −0.042 0.200 0.150 −6.682 **
(0.301) (0.236) (0.230) (2.952)
Natural resource
0.042 *** 0.056 *** 0.066 ***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Market size
0.679 *** 0.626 *** 0.729 ***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.055)
Infrastructure
distance
0.744 *** 0.980 *** 1.359 ***
(0.170) (0.171) (0.270)
Institutional
distance
0.239 * −0.039 0.189
(0.141) (0.146) (0.199)
Cultural distance
−0.240 *** −0.165 ** −0.255 ***
(0.061) (0.064) (0.094)
Doing business 0.008 0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
Labor force
0.046 *** 0.049 ***
(0.008) (0.008)
Industry/service −0.124 * −0.100
(0.065) (0.064)
nr*OBOR
−0.012
(0.014)
nr*OBOR*post −0.030
(0.020)
lnrgdp*OBOR −0.286 ***
(0.077)
lnrgdp*OBOR*post 0.276 **
(0.116)
fd*OBOR −0.371
(0.407)
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Table 6. Cont.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fd*OBOR*post 0.262
(0.453)
id*OBOR
−0.824 **
(0.328)
id*OBOR*post −0.221
(0.407)
cd*OBOR
0.284 **
(0.133)
cd*OBOR*post −0.172
(0.177)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted
R-squared 0.012 0.401 0.431 0.464
N 983 983 983 983
Notes: Parentheses below the estimated coefficients present their estimated standard errors. Estimations are
weighted by the population of each country (pop). ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
Finally, the estimation result using Equation (4) is presented in Column (4) of Table 6. Hypothesis 1
was not supported by the matching DID results, as the OBOR initiative might have decreased the
resource-seeking motivation of OFDI from China (−0.03, nearly significant at the 10% level). However,
Hypothesis 2 on the boosting effect of the OBOR initiative on the market-seeking motivation in
the OBOR countries was supported (0.276 after the initiative). Hence, the OBOR initiative boosted
the market-seeking motivation rather than the resource-seeking motivation in the OBOR countries,
even after we controlled for the potential selection biases. Moreover, there was no significantly
increasing effect of the initiative on the positive effect of infrastructure distance. Since the OBOR
initiative did not boost the infrastructure-led OFDI in the OBOR countries, Hypothesis 3 was not
supported by matching DID results. Hypothesis 4 was supported by the mitigating effect on
institution-based OFDI before (−0.824) and after (−0.221) the initiative in the OBOR countries. Cultural
distance was significantly negative in the non-OBOR countries (−25.5%), whereas the increasing effect
of the OBOR countries on China’s OFDI was still significantly positive (28.4%). The OBOR initiative
continues the long tradition of cultural convergence with these OBOR countries, which supported
Hypothesis 5. Therefore, the matching DID results did not change our basic conclusions about
the hypotheses.
6. Conclusions
China’s OFDI has increased significantly. This paper estimates the treatment effects of the OBOR
initiative on China’s OFDI by combining a DID estimator with matching techniques. We found that
China’s OFDI in the OBOR countries was about 40% higher than in the non-OBOR countries, suggesting
a good foundation of international investment even before the initiative. After the initiative, the OFDI
from China increased by 46.2% in the post-announcement period of 2014–2015. These results revealed
that the OBOR initiative has stimulated China’s OFDI in these related countries after 2013, compared
with other countries outside the OBOR. Further analysis showed that the growth in China’s OFDI
mainly occurred in the Maritime Silk Road (OR) countries rather than in the Continental Economic
Belt (OB) countries.
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However, after we controlled the heterogeneity across the OBOR and non-OBOR countries
by using the matching approach, the significance of the stimulating effect of the OBOR initiative
disappeared for China’s OFDI. This confirmed that the boosting effect of OBOR initiative on China’s
OFDI, rather than a pure policy effect, mainly reflects the different economic, institutional, and cultural
characteristics of the OBOR countries from the non-OBOR countries. It is also worth noting that Chinese
partnership with the OBOR countries is not due to random selection. On the contrary, the OBOR
countries have been carefully assessed based on country’s characteristics—such as natural resources,
market size, infrastructure, institutional distance, and culture proximity—in which cultural proximity
and market size were especially important for inclusion into the initiative. However, the political and
business institutions, labor resources, and economic structure of host countries were not as important as
expected in the selection process, reflecting a principle of seeking common ground while maintaining
differences, i.e., ‘qiú tong cún yì’.
We also found the OBOR initiative reduced the resource-seeking motivation and boosted the
market-seeking motivation of China’s OFDI. Our results cast doubts on the infrastructure-led and
institution-based strategy of the OBOR initiative, but supported the boosting effect of the OBOR
initiative on institutional cooperation and cultural convergence. Especially, cultural proximity
represents two sides of the same coin, so it is not only the most important criteria to be included in
the OBOR initiative, but also the most important factor in attracting China’s OFDI. The harmony in
diversity belief is deeply rooted in Chinese philosophy in reducing the cultural obstacles for political
and economic cooperation between countries. Thus, the OBOR initiative is a sustainable continuation
and development of the long tradition of economic, institutional, and cultural convergence with the
OBOR countries, rather than a temporary policy shock.
There are some limitations to be addressed in future research. First, we focused primarily on
country characteristics as antecedent factors of OBOR country selection, so our model does not account
for other possible drivers. Second, our dataset was constructed by archival and country-level data
from many data sources (mainly from the World Bank), which might be more consistent and reliable
than survey-based studies since all data were aggregated by national statistics departments. Future
research may focus more on case studies and survey-based data covering companies, which may allow
us to obtain more proxies. Additionally, there are many giant Chinese companies—such as Alibaba,
JD.com, and Tencent—which acquire foreign technologies and assets [76], but these were not studied
in detail. If future research can include these Chinese firms’ foreign investment, conclusions could be
more convincing.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Country categorization of the Silk Road Economic Belt (One Belt, OB), the New Maritime
Silk Road (One Road, OR), and non-OBOR.
OB (49) OR (25) Non-OBOR (142)
Afghanistan,
Albania,
Armenia,
Azerbaijan,
Belarus,
Belgium,
Bhutan,
Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Czech,
Estonia, France,
Georgia,
Germany,
Hungary, Iran,
Iraq, Israel,
Jordan,
Kazakhstan,
Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia,
Lebanon,
Lithuania,
Macedonia,
Moldova,
Mongolia,
Montenegro,
Nepal,
Netherlands,
Oman, Pakistan,
Poland, Qatar,
Romania,
Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Serbia,
Slovakia,
Slovenia, Syria,
Tajikistan,
Turkey,
Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates,
Uzbekistan,
Yemen
Bahrain,
Bangladesh,
Brunei,
Cambodia,
Croatia, Cyprus,
East Timor,
Egypt, Greece,
India,
Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Kenya,
Laos, Malaysia,
Maldives,
Myanmar,
Nigeria,
Philippines,
Singapore,
South Korea, Sri
Lanka,
Thailand,
Vietnam
Algeria, American Samoa, Andorra, Angola,
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Australia,
Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bermuda,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, British Virgin Islands,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon,
Canada, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic,
Chad, Channel Islands, Chile, Colombia, Comoros,
Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Costa Rica,
Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Curacao, Denmark, Djibouti,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Faroe Islands,
Fiji, Finland, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia,
Ghana, Gibraltar, Greenland, Grenada, Guam,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of
Man, Jamaica, Kiribati, Korea, Dem. People’s Rep,
Kosovo, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Macau SAR, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Micronesia, Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Northern Mariana Islands,
Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Rwanda,
Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sint Maarten (Dutch Part),
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South
Sudan, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Martin (French Part), St. Vincent and The
Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad And
Tobago, Tunisia, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu,
Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Vanuatu, Venezuela, RB, Virgin Islands (U.S.),
West Bank and Gaza, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3264 25 of 28
Sustainability 2018, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW  24 of 27 
 
 
Figure A1. Countries covered by OBOR initiative. Notes: Silk Road Economic Belt (OB, green), New 
Maritime Silk Road (OR, dark green), and non-OBOR (light green). 
References 
1. Du, J.; Zhang, Y. Does one belt one road strategy promote Chinese overseas direct investment? China Econ. 
Rev. 2018, 47, 189–205. 
2. Huang, Y.P. Understanding China’s belt & road initiative: Motivation, framework and assessment. China 
Econ. Rev. 2016, 40, 314–321. 
3. Liu, H.Y.; Tang, Y.K.; Chen, X.L.; Poznanska, J. The determinants of Chinese outward FDI in countries along 
“one belt one road”. Emerg. Mark. Financ. Trade 2017, 53, 1374–1387. 
4. Sauvant, K.P.; Chen, V.Z. China’s regulatory framework for outward foreign direct investment. China Econ. 
J. 2014, 7, 141–163. 
5. Swaine, M.D. Chinese views and commentary on the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. China Leadersh. Monit. 
2015, 47, 1–24. 
6. UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2017: Investment and the Digital Economy; United Nations: New York, NY, 
USA; Geneva, Switzerland, 2017. 
7. Busse, M.; Erdogan, C.; Mühlen, H. China’s impact on Africa—The role of trade, FDI and aid. Kyklos 2016, 
69, 228–262. 
8. Chen, H. China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative and its implications for Sino-African investment relations. 
Transnatl. Corp. Rev. 2016, 8, 178–182. 
9. Kaliszuk, E. Chinese and South Korean investment in Poland: A comparative study. Transnatl. Corp. Rev. 
2016, 8, 60–78. 
10. Buckley, P.J.; Clegg, L.J.; Cross, A.R.; Liu, X.; Voss, H.; Zheng, P. The determinants of Chinese outward 
foreign direct investment. J. Int. Bus. Stud. 2007, 38, 499–518. 
11. Wang, Y.; Du, J.; Wang, K. The determinants of location choices of China’s ODI: Institutions, taxation and 
resources. Front. Econ. China 2015, 10, 540–565. 
12. Amighini, A.; Rabellotti, R.; Sanfilippo, M. China’s outward FDI: An industry-level analysis of host country 
determinants. Front. Econ. China 2011, 8, 309–336. 
13. Cheung, Y.W.; Qian, X.W. The empirics of China’s outward direct investment. Pac. Econ. Rev. 2008, 14, 312–
341. 
14. Kolstad, I.; Wiig, A. What determines Chinese outward FDI? J. World Bus. 2012, 47, 26–34. 
15. Dunning, J.H. Trade, location of economic activity and the MNE: A search for an eclectic approach. In The 
International Allocation of Economic Activity; Ohlin, B., Hesselborn, P.O., Wijkman, P.M., Eds.; Macmillan: 
London, UK, 1977; pp. 395–418. 
16. Dunning, J.H. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy; Addison-Wesley: Wokingham, UK, 1993. 
17. Zhang, X.; Daly, K. The determinants of China’s outward foreign direct investment. Emerg. Mark. Rev. 2011, 
12, 389–398. 
Countries covered by OBOR ini ative. Notes: Silk Road Economic Belt (OB, green),
New Marit me Silk Road (OR, dark green), and non-OBOR (light green).
f r c s
1. u, J.; Zhang, Y. Does one belt one road strategy promote Chinese overseas direct investment? China Econ. Rev.
2018, 47, 189–205. [CrossRef]
2. uang, Y.P. Understanding China’s belt & road initiative: Motivation, framework and assessment.
China Econ. Rev. 2016, 40, 314–321.
3. Liu, .Y.; Tang, Y.K.; Chen, X.L.; Poznanska, J. The deter inants of Chinese out ard FDI in countries along
“one belt one road”. Emerg. ark. Financ. Trade 2017, 53, 1374–1387. [CrossRef]
4. Sauvant, K.P.; Chen, V.Z. China’s regulatory framework for outward foreign direct investment. China Econ. J.
2014, 7, 141–163. [CrossRef]
5. Swaine, .D. Chinese views and commentary on the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. China Leadersh. onit.
2015, 47, 1–24.
6. UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2017: Investment and the Digital Economy; United Nations: New York, NY, USA;
Geneva, Switzerland, 2017.
7. Busse, M.; Erdogan, C.; Mühlen, H. China’s impact on Africa—The role of trade, FDI and aid. Kyklos 2016,
69, 228–262. [CrossRef]
8. Chen, H. China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative and its implications for Sino-African investment relations.
Transnatl. Corp. Rev. 2016, 8, 178–182. [CrossRef]
9. Kaliszuk, E. Chinese and South Korean investment in Poland: A comparative study. Transnatl. Corp. Rev.
2016, 8, 60–78. [CrossRef]
10. Buckley, P.J.; Clegg, L.J.; Cross, A.R.; Liu, X.; Voss, H.; Zheng, P. The determinants of Chinese outward
foreign direct investment. J. Int. Bus. Stud. 2007, 38, 499–518. [CrossRef]
11. Wang, Y.; Du, J.; Wang, K. The determinants of location choices of China’s ODI: Institutions, taxation and
resources. Front. Econ. China 2015, 10, 540–565.
12. Amighini, A.; Rabellotti, R.; Sanfilippo, M. China’s outward FDI: An industry-level analysis of host country
determinants. Front. Econ. China 2011, 8, 309–336.
13. Cheung, Y.W.; Qian, X.W. The empirics of China’s outward direct investment. Pac. Econ. Rev. 2008, 14, 312–341.
[CrossRef]
14. Kolstad, I.; Wiig, A. What determines Chinese outward FDI? J. World Bus. 2012, 47, 26–34. [CrossRef]
15. Dunning, J.H. Trade, location of economic activity and the MNE: A search for an eclectic approach. In The
International Allocation of Economic Activity; Ohlin, B., Hesselborn, P.O., Wijkman, P.M., Eds.; Macmillan:
London, UK, 1977; pp. 395–418.
16. Dunning, J.H. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy; Addison-Wesley: Wokingham, UK, 1993.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3264 26 of 28
17. Zhang, X.; Daly, K. The determinants of China’s outward foreign direct investment. Emerg. Mark. Rev. 2011,
12, 389–398. [CrossRef]
18. Ye, G. Chinese transnational corporations. Transnatl. Corp. 1992, 1, 125–133.
19. Zhan, J.X. Transnationalization and outward investment: The case of Chinese firms. Transnatl. Corp. 1995,
4, 67–100.
20. Cai, K.G. Outward foreign direct investment: A novel dimension of China’s integration into the regional
and global economy. China Q. 1999, 160, 856–880. [CrossRef]
21. Wu, F.; Sia, Y.H. China’s rising investment in Southeast Asia: Trends and outlook. J. Asian Bus. 2002, 18, 41–61.
22. Chang, S.C. The determinants and motivations of China’s outward foreign direct investment: A spacial
gravity model. Glob. Econ. Rev. 2014, 43, 244–268. [CrossRef]
23. Buckley, P.J.; Casson, M. The Future of the Multinational Enterprise; Macmillan: London, UK, 1976.
24. UNCTAD. World Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants; United Nations: New York, NY, USA;
Geneva, Switzerland, 1998.
25. Chakrabarti, A. The determinants of foreign direct investments: Sensitivity analyses of cross-country
regressions. Kyklos 2001, 54, 89–114. [CrossRef]
26. Taylor, R. Globalization strategies of Chinese companies: Current developments and future prospects.
Asian Bus. Manag. 2002, 1, 209–225. [CrossRef]
27. Zhang, Y. China’s Emerging Global Businesses: Political Economy and Institutional Investigations; Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, UK, 2003.
28. Deng, P. Outward investment by Chinese MNCs: Motivations and implications. Bus. Horiz. 2004, 47, 8–16.
[CrossRef]
29. Coughlin, C.C.; Terza, J.V.; Arromdee, V. State characteristics and the location of foreign direct investment
within the United States. Rev. Econ. Stat. 1991, 73, 675–683. [CrossRef]
30. Wheeler, D.; Mody, A. International investment location decisions: The case of U.S. firms. J. Int. Econ. 1992,
33, 57–76. [CrossRef]
31. Cheng, L.K.; Kwan, Y.K. What are the determinants of the location of foreign direct investment? The Chinese
experience. J. Int. Econ. 2000, 51, 379–400. [CrossRef]
32. Asiedu, E. On the determinants of foreign direct investment to developing countries: Is Africa different?
World Dev. 2002, 30, 107–118. [CrossRef]
33. Deichmann, J.; Karidis, S.; Sayek, S. Foreign direct investment in turkey: Regional determinants. Appl. Econ.
2003, 35, 1767–1778. [CrossRef]
34. Li, S.; Park, S.H. Determinants of locations of foreign direct investment in China. Manag. Organ. Rev. 2006,
2, 95–119. [CrossRef]
35. Bellak, C.; Leibrecht, M.; Damijan, J.P. Infrastructure endowment and corporate income taxes as determinants
of foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern European countries. World Econ. 2009, 22, 267–290.
[CrossRef]
36. Fedderke, J.W.; Romm, A.T. Growth impact and determinants of foreign direct investment into South Africa,
1956–2003. Econ. Model. 2006, 23, 738–760. [CrossRef]
37. Calvo, G.A.; Leiderman, L.; Reinhart, C.M. Inflows of capital to developing countries in the 1990s.
J. Econ. Perspect. 1996, 10, 123–139. [CrossRef]
38. Femandez-Arias, E. The new wave of private capital inflows: Push or pull? J. Dev. Econ. 1996, 48, 389–418.
[CrossRef]
39. Fermandez-Arias, E.; Montiel, P.J. The surge in capital inflows to developing countries: An analytical
overview. World Bank Econ. Rev. 1996, 10, 51–77. [CrossRef]
40. Sekkat, K.; Veganzones-Varoudakis, M.A. Openness, investment climate, and FDI in developing countries.
Rev. Dev. Econ. 2007, 11, 607–620. [CrossRef]
41. Henley, J.; Kirkpatrick, C.; Wilde, G. Foreign direct investment in China: Recent trends and current policy
issues. World Econ. 1999, 22, 223–243. [CrossRef]
42. Yeung, H.W.C. The internationalisation of ethnics Chinese business firms from Southeast Asia: Strategies,
processes and competitive advantages. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 1999, 23, 88–102. [CrossRef]
43. Sikorski, D.; Menkhoff, T. Internationalisation of Asian business. Singap. Manag. Rev. 2000, 22, 1–17.
44. Ng, L.F.Y.; Tuan, C. Building a favourable investment environment: Evidence for the facilitation of FDI in
China. World Econ. 2002, 25, 1095–1114. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3264 27 of 28
45. Katz, L.F.; Murphy, K.M. Changes in relative wages, 1963–1987: Supply and demand factors. Q. J. Econ. 1992,
107, 35–78. [CrossRef]
46. Saarimaa, T. Tax incentives and demand for mortgage debt: Evidence from the Finnish 1993 tax reform.
Int. J. Hous. Policy 2010, 10, 19–40. [CrossRef]
47. World Bank. World Development Indicators, World Bank. 2017. Available online: https://datacatalog.
worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators (accessed on 5 April 2018).
48. World Bank. The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development in the New Millennium;
Environment and Development; World Bank: Washington, DC, USA, 2011.
49. Aleksynska, M.; Havrylchyk, O. FDI from the south: The role of institutional distance and natural resources.
Eur. J. Political Econ. 2013, 29, 38–53. [CrossRef]
50. World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank. 2018. Available online: https://datacatalog.
worldbank.org/dataset/worldwide-governance-indicators (accessed on 5 April 2018).
51. Hofstede, G. Cultural constraints in management theories. Executive 1993, 7, 81–94. [CrossRef]
52. Hofstede, G. Do American theories apply in China? In Cross-Cultural Management; SISU: Shanghai, China,
2015; Volume 3, pp. 21–27.
53. Kogut, B.; Singh, H. The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. J. Int. Bus. Stud. 1988, 19, 411–432.
[CrossRef]
54. Fu, X.M.; Chen, H.X.; Xue, Z.K. Construction of the belt and road trade cooperation network from the
multi-distances perspective. Sustainability 2018, 10, 1439. [CrossRef]
55. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Summary of the Dates of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between
the People’s Republic of China and Other Countries. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of P.R.C. Available online:
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/2193_674977/ (accessed on 15 August 2018).
56. World Bank. Doing Business. The World Bank, 2018. Available online: http://www.doingbusiness.org
(accessed on 5 April 2018).
57. Hanna, R. US environmental regulation and FDI: Evidence from a panel of US-based multinational firms.
Am. Econ. J. Appl. Econ. 2010, 2, 158–189. [CrossRef]
58. Cai, X.; Lu, Y.; Wu, M.; Yu, L. Does environmental regulation drive away inbound foreign direct investment?
Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China. J. Dev. Econ. 2016, 123, 73–85. [CrossRef]
59. Stevenson, B.; Wolfers, J. Economic growth and happiness. In Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; Spring:
Palo Alto, CA, USA, 2008.
60. Arnold, J.M.; Javorcik, B.S. Gifted kids or pushy parents? Foreign direct investment and plant productivity
in Indonesia. J. Int. Econ. 2009, 79, 42–53. [CrossRef]
61. Vogel, A.; Wagner, J. Higher productivity in importing German manufacturing firms: Self-selection, learning
from importing, or both? Rev. World Econ. 2010, 145, 641–665. [CrossRef]
62. Peng, F.; Kang, L.; Jiang, J. Selection and institutional shareholder activism in Chinese acquisitions.
Manag. Decis. 2013, 51, 141–162. [CrossRef]
63. Chang, S.J.; Chung, J.; Moon, J.J. When do foreign subsidiaries outperform local firms? J. Int. Bus. Stud. 2013,
44, 853–860. [CrossRef]
64. Borisov, A.; Goldman, E.; Gupta, N. The corporate value of (corrupt) lobbying. Rev. Financ. Stud. 2016,
29, 1039–1071. [CrossRef]
65. Rosenbaum, P.R.; Rubin, D.B. The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal
effects. Biometrika 1983, 70, 41–55. [CrossRef]
66. Caliendo, M.; Kopeinig, S. Some practical guidance for the implementation of propensity score matching.
J. Econ. Surv. 2008, 22, 31–72. [CrossRef]
67. Blundell, R.; Dias, M.C. Evaluation methods for non-experimental data. Fisc. Stud. 2000, 21, 427–468. [CrossRef]
68. Heckman, J.J.; Ichimura, H.; Todd, P.E. Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator: Evidence from
evaluating a job training programme. Rev. Econ. Stud. 1997, 64, 605–654. [CrossRef]
69. Asiedu, E. Foreign direct investment in Africa: The role of natural resources, market size, government policy,
institutions and political instability. World Econ. 2006, 29, 63–77. [CrossRef]
70. Kamal, M.A.; Li, Z.; Akhmat, G.; Bashir, M.F.; Khan, K. What determines China’s FDI inflow to South Asia?
Mediterr. J. Soc. Sci. 2014, 5, 254–263.
71. Urata, S.; Kawai, H. The determinants of the location of foreign direct investment by Japanese small and
medium sized enterprises. Small Bus. Econ. 2000, 15, 79–103. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3264 28 of 28
72. Duanmu, J.L. The effect of corruption distance and market orientation on the ownership choice of MNEs:
Evidence from China. J. Int. Manag. 2011, 17, 162–174. [CrossRef]
73. Li, Q.; Liang, G. Political Relations and Chinese Outbound Direct Investment: Evidence from Firm- and Dyadic-Level
Tests; RCCPB Working Paper #19; Indiana University: Bloomington, IN, USA, 2012.
74. Filatotchev, I.; Kepelyushnikov, R.; Dyomina, N.; Aukusionek, S. The effects of ownership concentration on
investment and performance in privatised firms in Russia. Manag. Decis. Econ. 2001, 22, 299–313. [CrossRef]
75. Leonidou, S.C.; Katsikeas, C.S. The export development process—An integrative review of empirical models.
J. Int. Bus. Stud. 1996, 27, 517–551. [CrossRef]
76. UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan; United Nations: New York,
NY, USA; Geneva, Switzerland, 2014.
© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
